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HEADQUARTERS USAF INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT



WARSAW PACT RELIABILITY:

THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

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1. This publication is designed to furnish substantive intelligence assessments to USAF organizations and key individuals as specified by the ACS/Intelligence. These assessments are prepared by analysts assigned to Air Force Intelligence. The common purpose of each assessment is to provide informed judgments on foreign military, political, and socio-economic developments affecting the attainment of national objectives and USAF missions.

2. This assessment is meant to bring together in a unified discussion what is known about Soviet perceptions of the reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies. During the preparation of this publication, it became evident there is little substantive material available relating to this subject; it is therefore an extremely fertile field for further investigation. This assessment is intended to disseminate what is known about Soviet perceptions and to stimulate further collection and research on a subject of vital concern to the US and its Allies.

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Intelligence

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Intelligence Assessment
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Introduction

(U) The USSR is well aware the reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies' military forces is a key factor in the political and military equation in Europe. Reliability has been of critical concern to the Soviets in the past and was of decisive importance in the Soviet decisions to intervene in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It may yet prove to be a key factor in any contemplated Soviet decision to intervene with military force in Poland.

(S) Warsaw Pact military plans presuppose the full participation of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) armed forces. Lacking reasonable assurances of reliable Warsaw Pact support of military operations, the USSR would be very unlikely to initiate hostilities against NATO except in what it deemed the direst necessity. It is almost certain the Soviets have developed contingency plans in the event its NSWP allies should waver in their commitment to a war against NATO. Yet, in order to institute such plans, the Soviets realize they must constantly appraise Pact reliability in any situation.

(S/NOFORN) Warsaw Pact forces opposing NATO are primarily Soviet, but NSWP forces make a significant contribution--and indeed are critical--to Soviet strategy for conflict in Europe. Of the 163 active Warsaw Pact divisions opposing NATO, 53 belong

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to the NSWP countries. Besides these active divisions, the NSWP armies also have mobilization divisions which can be geared up for conflict in Western Europe (4 East German, 2 Polish, 2 Czechoslovak, and 3 Bulgarian), although even at full strength these would be smaller and less well-equipped than standard Warsaw Pact divisions. The Pact's success in achieving its wartime objectives will depend upon its ability to control and coordinate multinational, joint service operations of great complexity. In implementing these wartime plans, the reliability of the NSWP forces is a critical factor in Soviet calculations of the projected success of these military operations.

(S) Besides constituting in sheer bulk nearly a third of the Warsaw Pact divisions available for combat against NATO, certain NSWP armies are tasked with specific frontal operations against NATO, a fact which increases their importance in the Soviet scheme of things and renders all the more important the question of their reliability. The Soviets and their NSWP allies have established a Northern Front in the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) comprised of 15 Polish army divisions. This front is commanded by a Polish general and his staff and is the only Warsaw Pact command at the front level or higher which is headed by a non-Soviet officer. The Soviets are also counting on Czechoslovak divisions to shoulder a large share of the potential fighting in the southern portion of the Western TVD. The Soviets have sought to assure the reliability of

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the Polish and Czechoslovak units by targeting them against traditional enemies, the Germans. However, if the Soviets should discover they cannot rely upon these Warsaw Pact allied forces, they will be forced to use Soviet forces from other, possibly critical, areas to cover the resulting gaps in the Warsaw Pact lines.

(S) Recent events in Poland have placed in grave doubt the wisdom of relying upon the Poles for so critical a role in Warsaw Pact war plans. Although Moscow hopes in time--with the normalization of the Polish situation and the resumption of normal military and political training in the Polish Armed Forces--the Poles can be counted upon fully to perform their wartime mission, the Soviets may be planning to assume a larger role in the operations of the Northern Front.

(S) Besides the importance of the NSWP countries in the conduct of actual military operations against NATO, the territories of these countries are vital for the movement of Soviet military forces and supplies. The major lines of communication from the USSR run through Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia and the national forces of these three countries are responsible for the operation, maintenance, and protection of these networks. The importance of these networks and their vulnerability was in stark evidence during the Polish crisis when labor disorders in virtually all sectors of the Polish economy seriously curtailed deliveries of essential raw materials, such as coal, to the

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Soviet Union. Consequently, Moscow must be assured of NSWP reliability if it is to be able to count upon a smooth functioning of the logistics systems vital to its conduct of offensive war against NATO.

(S) While the dependence upon the NSWP countries for a third of the divisions and virtually all of the LOCs in the Forward Area suggests the Soviets have judged whatever reliability problems may occur to be manageable, the Soviets continually monitor and attempt to improve this reliability. Moscow no doubt is extremely sensitive to any changes which would force modifications in its war planning.

Ensuring Warsaw Pact Effectiveness

(U) Concerned as they are about the factor of reliability in their war planning, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have adopted a series of measures intended to assure the total subordination of the military to the interests of the ruling parties and the concomitant reliability of the national forces in the event of conflict with the West.

(U) Among those actions designed to assure the political subordination of the military to the Party elite are the creation of numerous Party-military interfaces designed to establish the "politicization" of the armed forces, the cooption of the officer corps into the power structure, and the establishment of a political control structure consisting of both a political control network

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organic to the military--the main political administrations--and security police "special sections" tasked with rooting out "subversion" and "disloyalty." The main political administrations also work to ensure the reliability of the armed forces through political education of the troops. Other measures used to encourage Pact reliability include joint Warsaw Pact exercises--designed to test wartime concepts and to condition the NSWP forces to working and fighting with their Soviet "comrades in arms"--; designation for Warsaw Pact service of key armed forces units whose political and military reliability is much higher than the average unit; and--in several Warsaw Pact countries--the creation of relatively large, politically reliable security troop bodies. In the last case, the use of more reliable forces spares the largely conscript regular forces the odious task of firing upon fellow countrymen, thereby forestalling what could constitute a major test of their reliability.

(S) Finally, the USSR itself employs several methods through which it seeks to exercise control over its NSWP allies to assure their commitment to the Warsaw Pact mission as perceived in Moscow. These methods include the assignment of Soviet "liaison officers" to the national ministries of defense and the stationing of Soviet military advisers, in many cases, down to the division level; the maintenance of bilateral military agreements with the NSWP treaty members; and Soviet domination of the command positions in

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the Warsaw Pact, despite some greater efforts in recent years to give at least a superficial appearance of intrapact cooperation.

The Party-Military Connection

(U) One of the means by which the loyalty and reliability of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states is assured is the politicization of the military. Within the USSR, this has proceeded to the point where there is a substantial congruence of values between Party and military leaders concerning the goals of societal change, the legitimacy of Party rule, and the desirability of further expanding Soviet military power. The military is represented on the highest Party bodies, and Party affiliation and loyalty are prerequisites for advancement in rank and responsibility. The military is accorded a leading role in the determination of defense and national security issues and enjoys a high degree of autonomy in the elaboration of Soviet military science. The congruence of Party and military views and the recognition of the unique needs and capabilities of the military have resulted in a firm commitment by the military to the political system.

(U) The situation is somewhat different in the NSWP states, however. This is the result of several factors, among them the relative newness of the regimes and military establishments and the dominance of Soviet military doctrine. The latter attribute negates somewhat the need for an East European military possessing the unique knowledge and skills characteristic of its Soviet counterpart. The degree of politicization of the military varies from

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country to country among the NSWP states, but in general the East European militaries have not been as involved in Party politics and the formulation of foreign and defense policies as their Soviet comrades. Nonetheless, East European military input into regime decisionmaking appears to have increased over the years. Poland is the most obvious and extreme example of this development.

(U) The existence of East European military establishments standing outside the arena of Party politics in the past created the potential for an armed forces leadership which placed national interests above those of the communist regime. This certainly caused the Soviets some concern as to the reliability of their East European allies: in 1956, Khrushchev was confronted by Polish military units willing to fight Soviet forces to protect Polish sovereignty. More recently, Jaruzelski purportedly declared in 1976 Polish armed forces would not fire on Polish workers.*

(U) Despite these past concerns, overall trends in Party-military relations in Eastern Europe should steadily change in Moscow's favor. The longer the East European regimes are in power, the greater becomes the military's stake in preserving the status quo, thereby protecting its privileged position in society. The East European militaries increasingly have become involved in regime policymaking; consequently, their interests conform ever more closely to those of the Party leadership. This

*It was, in fact, the Polish security forces (the ZUM0) which had primary responsibility for imposing martial law. See the discussion on p. 15 below.

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trend toward greater convergence of views may be encouraged still further by the ever larger numbers of officers fully educated in the Party-military ethos of the Soviet bloc who join the Eastern European armed forces leadership cadres.

(U) At the same time, this poses another potential source of trouble for the Soviets. As the East European military leaderships increase their expertise in military affairs and expand their access to and identification with the communist regimes, they may well become more resistant to the Soviets' treatment of them as "junior partners" in the Warsaw Pact. While this will have little if any impact upon the overall reliability of the Warsaw Pact in the near term, Moscow's continued heavy-handed dominance of Pact affairs could exacerbate existing frictions within the alliance structure.

Cooption of the Officer Corps

(U) Closely related to the use of Party-military interfaces to ensure the reliability of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in the event of internal and external crises is the cooption by the Party leadership of the leading members of the military high command, thereby acquiring directly their military expertise and giving them direct access to the policymaking process. Senior military leaders serve on the party politburos and defense councils in the Warsaw Pact states, thus assuring them of a direct input into the national security decision- and policymaking process.

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It must also be assumed, since it is the Party elite which reaches down into the military to coopt its leading members, only those who appear to be the most politically reliable and committed to regime policies will be selected.

(U) In light of the above, one must treat with caution the characterizations of such East European military leaders as Jaruzelski as "national communists" who might challenge the political legitimacy of the East European communist regimes. Jaruzelski may well possess a differing perception of the proper means for achieving political and economic change within the constraints of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. However, his political training, his military training in the USSR and connections with the Soviet military leadership, and his rise to the top of the Polish Party and government apparatus attest to his overall firm commitment to regime policies which will pose no serious threat to Moscow. The same can be said of virtually all other military leaders within the Warsaw Pact states. Quite simply, these military leaders would not have risen to the top if they had demonstrated less than complete commitment to the socialist system.

The Political Control Apparatus in the Military

(U) In all the Warsaw Pact countries there exists an extensive system of political education and controls designed to ensure the reliability of the armed forces and improve their fighting spirit.

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The system of political education is intended to instill in the officer and conscript the proper moral-patriotic feelings toward military duty and the communist homeland. The control apparatus functions as a watchdog to weed out those individuals who fail to demonstrate the proper values and represent a potential threat to discipline and morale. With the passage of time and the emergence of a truly communist military cadre, the control function has become less important, but the role of the political apparatus as a "national university" for moral-patriotic education has increased.

(U) The Warsaw Pact political control apparatus consists of main political administrations (MPA) of the armed forces. Although the chiefs of these MPAs hold military rank and are considered part of the military high command, their organizations are actually directly subordinate to the communist party and report through party channels. These separate reporting channels provide the Party an alternate source of information for assessing the status of the armed forces. The MPA structure parallels the military chain of command, with deputy commanders for political affairs (zampolit) assigned down to the company level. Although these "political" officers primarily are responsible for troop indoctrination, they do wear military rank and share culpability with the military commander for any decline in the overall combat readiness of the troops of the unit. The political officer's evaluation of the officers and the troops under their command is

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an important part of their personnel folders and is critical to their opportunities for promotion.

(U) Troop Education. Military-patriotic education at the troop level consumes several hours each week of the troop training schedule. Its central themes stress the importance of the international socialist duty of the soldier and the "predatory," "aggressive" nature of the West. The Warsaw Pact soldier is to be instilled with a hatred of his capitalist "class enemy." The West is portrayed as the main threat to world peace; this characterization is contrasted with the peaceful, "defensive" nature of Warsaw Pact military policy.

(C) While much of the content of political education proves to be tedious to the average conscript and there is some concern over the effectiveness of troop indoctrination (the Warsaw Pact military press is replete with criticism of the failings of various political officers and their training efforts), the program overall has a positive impact from the standpoint of the Party and military leadership. Military-patriotic education complements and builds upon the political training which citizens of the Warsaw Pact states receive virtually from infancy. Despite the reported cynicism among many youth in the communist countries of Eastern Europe, interviews with defectors and emigres make it clear the citizen comes to accept many of the precepts of the communist world view and comes to view the West through the

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prism of his communist political indoctrination.

(U) Troop Control. Political reliability is critical to advancement in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. The enterprising young conscript will seek Party membership if he wishes to advance in rank, and a Party membership card is a virtual necessity for the officer who wants to get ahead. Warsaw Pact troops, particularly the officer cadre, are evaluated partly upon the basis of their "party mindedness" (partiynost'). Anyone who demonstrates the slightest deviation from the Party line or who displays a lack of commitment to Party work in the military runs a grave risk of jeopardizing his military career--or subsequent civilian career, in the case of the conscript.

(U) The Security Police Apparatus. Complementing the activities of the Party MPA apparatus within the military are the "special sections" of the security police. These organs are tasked with weeding out espionage and subversion within the armed forces. There can be little doubt they also evaluate the political reliability of the individual service member. In short, these organs serve in a counterintelligence role very similar to that of the investigative services of the US armed forces. However, they are organizationally separate from the armed forces and their purview extends to ferreting out "ideological diversions," a crime which is interpreted very broadly in the communist lexicon.

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Warsaw Pact Exercises

(U) The Warsaw Pact yearly conducts a series of command post and set piece field exercises--such as "Union" and "Brotherhood-in-Arms"--designed to test joint command procedures. Perhaps just as importantly, however, these exercises condition the NSWP staffs to working and fighting with their Soviet comrades. The exercises demonstrate Pact solidarity, and however much one may question the true military utility of some of these exercises, they do serve to reinforce perceptions of the Pact defending against potential Western aggression. The exercises serve one other important function: they demonstrate the USSR's military power, thereby reminding the NSWP allies of the limits of their autonomy.

Designation of Key Units for Warsaw Pact Duty

(S) The NSWP countries also attempt to resolve potential problems of troop reliability along the border with NATO through another means: the designation of the more politically reliable, better trained military units for Warsaw Pact duty. Poland, for example, has committed half its ground forces to the Warsaw Pact in the event of a conflict with NATO. The remainder would stay in Poland as part of a so-called internal front. The "external" front committed to the Pact consists of eight mechanized divisions, five armored divisions, one sea landing division, one airborne division, and other front and army combat and support units. These 15 divisions comprise the Warsaw Pact's Northern--or Polish--

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front, a key component of the Soviet's Western theater of military operations (TVD).

(C) The USSR does not follow a conscious policy of assigning its most reliable units to the NATO theater, but the disposition of the Soviet population achieves the same effect. The regions of the USSR nearest NATO are predominantly Slavic, and the mobilization reserves for the Category II and III divisions in this area will come from these areas. At a time when the Soviet leadership may be concerned with the problem of successfully integrating increasing numbers of non-Slavic, non-Russian speaking peoples into the armed forces, this factor should help to lessen concern about the potential effectiveness of the Soviet units along the Western front.

The Role of Internal Security Forces

(U) All Warsaw Pact states maintain relatively large troop bodies tasked with providing internal security against both domestic and external enemies. Although some Western sources refer to these troop bodies as "paramilitary," they in fact could constitute a sizable augmentation to the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact; consequently, they should be considered assets of the armed forces of the member states--although they do not report through ministry of defense channels. These troops generally consist of the most highly capable, politically reliable young men drafted for military service since they are, in effect, the "palace guard" of the communist regime.

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(U) These forces all have a key role to play in the event of domestic unrest in the Warsaw Pact countries. In all likelihood, the regime will opt to use these more politically reliable forces, rather than regular army troops, to put down domestic disturbances. This will spare the regular armed forces conscript the potentially traumatic experience of firing on his fellow countrymen, an event which could rapidly lead to a decline in the morale and political reliability of the regular army. It was this uncertainty over the reliability of the regular armed forces in quelling domestic unrest which explains why the Polish regime relied primarily upon the security forces to bear the bulk of the burden of imposing martial law and ending worker strikes and demonstrations, although regular army units stood ready to render assistance.

Soviet Measures for Controlling The Warsaw Pact Allies

(U) Beyond the active measures all Warsaw Pact states use to enhance the reliability and effectiveness of their armed forces, there are certain other steps the Soviet Union has taken to ensure its control over its East European comrades. These measures are designed to neutralize any anti-Soviet or nationalist sentiment within the NSWP armed forces and guarantee NSWP military planning is in strict accordance with Soviet objectives.

Soviet Military Representation in the Warsaw Pact

(S) The USSR maintains a senior military representative to each of the NSWP ministries of defense. His job entails far

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more than simple liaison, however; he is responsible for overseeing the activities of the Soviet advisers which are present in almost all the NSWP armies down to the division level. These advisers do much more than assist their East European military comrades in resolving military questions; they make key inputs into NSWP military decisionmaking at all levels of the "host" country's military establishment. This pervasive Soviet military presence may have been instrumental in neutralizing whatever latent sentiment for active military resistance may have existed within the Czechoslovak armed forces in 1968.

(S) In addition, these Soviet military advisers are tasked with reporting upon the political as well as combat readiness of the national forces to which they are assigned. These assessments would be expected to play a key role in the selection of NSWP officer cadre for further advancement in rank and responsibility and selection for higher command schools in the USSR.

(U) Another example of Soviet military "representation" to control the NSWP allies can be found in the groups of forces stationed in the Forward Area. While the political control function of the groups of forces may be relatively less important in the case of the GDR, it is certainly accurate to say they fulfill this role in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and they could, if necessary perform this mission in Poland as well. Should the armed forces of any of the NSWP member states falter in the event of a

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conflict with the West, the Soviet groups of forces could be used to stiffen their will to fight.

(U) Finally, the Soviets dispatch high-ranking military leaders on official visits to their Warsaw Pact allies, another visible reminder of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. Soviet troops in Eastern Europe also conduct publicized visits to Soviet war memorials located throughout the region, a step designed to remind the citizens of these states of their World War II debt to the USSR for liberation from Nazi occupation.

Domination of Command Positions in the Warsaw Pact

(S) Despite certain cosmetic changes in recent years designed to give the appearance of greater involvement of the NSWP military leadership in Warsaw Pact command and control, Pact doctrine, tactics, policies, armaments, and materiel continue to be dominated overwhelmingly by the Soviets. The Pact Commander and his Chief of Staff, as well as the theater and forces commanders, have always been Soviet officers. It is doubtful this situation ever will change appreciably.

(C) NSWP defense and deputy defense ministers now meet fairly regularly with their Soviet counterparts to discuss Pact policy and there has been a modest effort towards drawing NSWP officers into the Pact's field command structure. Pact meetings occasionally are characterized by resistance to Soviet policy initiatives--principally coming from the Romanians--and several NSWP countries

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have expressed concern over meeting Soviet defense spending objectives for the Pact as a whole. Nevertheless, Soviet preferences still carry the day in virtually all significant Pact matters. Given the unequal nature of the alliance and the dependence of the NSWP armed forces upon the USSR for equipment and materiel, it could not be otherwise.

(U) Although the Soviets probably perceive their almost total dominance of the Warsaw Pact as beneficial in guaranteeing the control of the NSWP armed forces, there is a counterproductive side to continued Soviet dominance. The growing economic and military potential of several of the NSWP countries and the public characterization of the Pact as a partnership likely will result in increasing pressures from the NSWP states for a more important voice in the determination of Pact policies. Soviet resistance to these demands will only serve to increase frictions within the alliance structure. Nevertheless, Moscow probably feels such friction is a small price to pay to ensure the Warsaw Pact conforms to Soviet national objectives. The growing sophistication of Soviet/Warsaw Pact combined arms doctrine and the increasing technical complexity of Warsaw Pact armament may result in even greater Soviet domination of the Pact, despite the wishes of Moscow's NSWP allies.

Bilateral Military Agreements with Eastern Europe

(U) Moscow also has been careful to establish a series of

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bilateral military treaties with all its East European allies which tie them almost as closely to the USSR as do the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty. Finally, the Warsaw Pact Joint Command is not a wartime command structure. The Soviets even now would control the military operations of their Warsaw Pact allies through a High Command in the Western TVD--a wartime command structure directly subordinate to the USSR's Supreme High Command--although nominally there would continue to be a "Unified Command" of the Warsaw Pact.

The Soviet Assessment of Pact Reliability

(C) Overall Soviet perceptions of Pact reliability are critical to Moscow's planning for operations against the West. The political status of these forces is considered to be a critical ingredient in the Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces" between the USSR and the West. Ensuring a high moral-patriotic sense of duty to the socialist commonwealth is a primary concern for the Soviet military leadership. However, Soviet perceptions are difficult to define due to the absence of conclusive data. We know the Soviets monitor Warsaw Pact reliability, work to improve it, and evince concern over any signs of its deterioration. Although we cannot state precisely the overall Soviet assessment of the reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies, a general assessment can be made. Such factors as the domestic situation in a NSWP country--Poland comes most readily to mind in this regard--the deteriorat-

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ing economic situation of the East European countries, and NSWP member states' resistance to certain Soviet policy initiatives no doubt generate concern in Moscow over the reliability of Eastern Europe. These problems, however, do not help to define the parameters of the Soviet assessment of how much it can rely upon the NSWP member states in the event of a conflict with the West. This assessment is a composite derived from other sources, including Warsaw Pact exercises, Soviet planning for war with NATO, and Soviet initiatives within the Pact.

(C) The overall situation at the time of a decision for action also is a determining factor in assessing NSWP reliability. The Soviets make special efforts to monitor reliability closely, including sending delegations led by senior officers to evaluate reliability in a crisis situation; e.g., such groups were sent to Poland.

(S) What we know about current Pact war plans and the degree of NSWP armed forces involvement in those plans indicates Moscow believes it can, under most conditions, count upon its Warsaw Pact allies in the event of conflict with NATO, at least during the early stages. East European forces and lines of communication are critical to the conduct of a war against NATO, and there is no evidence the Soviets have deemphasized their importance in such a conflict. Nevertheless, the events in Poland probably have forced the Soviets to reevaluate Poland's contribution to Pact war plans and to devise contingency plans which place less reliance

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upon the Polish armed forces to carry out missions in their assigned frontal area of responsibility.

The Polish Crisis and the Soviet Reaction

(S) Recent Soviet military activity indicates serious concern over the repercussions of the Polish crisis for Warsaw Pact planning. The massive Soviet exercise Zapad-81 (West) held in the Baltic Sea area and the Western USSR in early September 1981 may in part indicate Soviet contingency planning for assuming responsibility for operations in the Northern (Polish) Front of the Western TVD. There were no Polish forces involved in the exercise, which appeared to exercise several of the operational concepts and objectives which would be expected in the Northern Front. Given the current crisis in Poland, the USSR probably realizes it cannot count upon the full level of Polish participation previously planned for in the event of war with NATO. This may only be a perception of a temporary weakness; the Soviets no doubt are hoping stability will return to Poland in time and Warsaw will once again be able to meet fully its commitments to Pact objectives. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the possibility they perceive the problem with the Poles to be a more long-term one which will require permanent realignments of Warsaw Pact missions and forces.

(U) The Polish crisis probably poses the most clear-cut challenge to Warsaw Pact military integrity ever, at least from the Soviet perspective. There can be little doubt the challenge represented by Solidarity and the danger of the spread of the

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"counterrevolutionary" virus to the rest of Eastern Europe are of more than passing concern to the Soviets and have increased Moscow's sensitivities to any signs of weakness within the Pact. There is no evidence, however--short of possible changes to accommodate the Polish situation--which would indicate the Soviets have altered their view of the overall reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies.

Soviet Prophylaxis: Tying Eastern Europe More Closely to Moscow

(U) Soviet efforts to achieve greater political, economic, and political integration of Eastern Europe and the USSR are evidence of a more long-term concern over potential challenges to Warsaw Pact integrity. Moscow was very likely concerned the rapid increase in East European commercial and cultural ties with the West following the advent of detente in the early 1970s posed a possible threat to the raison d'etre of the Warsaw Pact: defense against the threat of Western aggression. Consequently, the Soviets claimed there could be no lessening of the ideological struggle even during a period of diplomatic detente. Soviet interest in inoculating its Warsaw Pact brethren against the virus of Western democracy was more apparent in its intensified efforts to promote increased integration of the Soviet and East European economies and societies. The Soviets have pointedly noted to Warsaw the allegedly disastrous effects upon the Polish economy produced by an overreliance upon the economic credits from

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the West, a comment Moscow no doubt intends to serve as a warning to the other Warsaw Pact member states. Moscow likely believes the other East European economies will be more wary of any further expansion of trade with the West, thereby increasing the importance of their economic ties to the USSR. There can be little doubt the Soviet leadership sees in closer economic and political integration a further guarantee of the military reliability of the NSWP armed forces.

The Soviet Balance Sheet

(U) Moscow realizes the degree of NSWP reliability will depend to a great degree on the conditions under which war breaks out and is waged. Although the Soviets are aware a number of scenarios are possible for war in Central Europe, Moscow appears generally to adhere to one scenario for Warsaw Pact military planning purposes. Soviet exercises and military writings presume a conflict in Europe will be preceded by a lengthy period--perhaps several weeks--of increasing international tensions. Once war erupts, Soviet/Warsaw Pact doctrine calls for rapid offensive warfare against NATO with the objective of defeating the NATO forces and occupying much of Western Europe in the shortest possible time. The Soviets know a number of factors could well intervene to disrupt such a scenario for wartime success, but it is the scenario which guides their planning and determines the role of the NSWP allies in that planning.

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(U) The USSR is acutely aware the reliability of its Warsaw Pact allies is dependent upon many factors once conflict with the West appears imminent or actually breaks out. The Soviets and their allies will thoroughly prepare their populations for the prospect of conflict and will attempt to portray the West as the aggressive party. Given the party's virtually complete control of the media and the propaganda organs, this task will be greatly simplified. The Warsaw Pact states thus should prove capable of manipulating the perception of the peoples of Eastern Europe concerning responsibility for the outbreak of war. Consequently, it will be difficult for the West to ensure an effective counter to Soviet and East European propaganda in this regard, although some measures to do so will be available.

(U) Success, rather than an assessment of responsibility for starting war in Europe, should prove to be the more decisive factor in ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact forces. Success in a war against NATO, regardless of who started it, likely will breed enthusiasm on the part of the NSWP armed forces for continuing the conflict against such traditional enemies as the Germans. An unsuccessful war could well begin to tear at the fabric of Warsaw Pact reliability, but the Soviets probably believe NSWP reliability will remain sufficiently intact short of a complete collapse of the Soviet Armed Forces. Should war with NATO evolve into a protracted conventional conflict in which the West has a chance to mobilize

its resources such as it did in World War II, victory for the Soviets would become problematic. Consequently, the Soviet doctrine for war in Europe emphasizes rapid offensive warfare against NATO with military objectives to be achieved in the shortest possible time, thereby denying the Western powers time to bring their reserves into play and the East Europeans the opportunity to reconsider their situations.

(U) Based upon what we currently know about Soviet war plans, the Soviets probably believe they can count upon their Warsaw Pact allies to carry out a war with NATO based upon this scenario. The Warsaw Pact force posture and concepts for war in Europe provide ample evidence of this overall Soviet assessment of the reliability of the NSWP armed forces. Nevertheless, the Soviets probably believe some of their East European allies will prove more steadfast in the conflict than others. Based upon the state of Soviet relations with each country and the status of the armed forces in each, the USSR probably believes Bulgaria and the GDR are the most reliable of its Warsaw Pact allies. Poland, once considered among the most reliable, likely has dropped in the Soviet estimation--albeit perhaps only temporarily--to somewhere in the middle of the reliability scale, probably roughly on a par with Hungary. Should the situation in Poland stabilize and the economic situation begin improving, the Polish armed forces may well regain their former stature in the Soviets' eyes. Czechoslovakia, for obvious reasons pertaining to 1968, must be considered

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to be even less reliable. The Soviets have sought to counter the problem with the Czechoslovak armed forces through the establishment of a joint Soviet-Czechoslovak Front opposite Prague's traditional enemy, the Germans. Finally, the Romanians--who continue to refuse closer cooperation with the Pact, quarrel incessantly with the USSR over foreign policy issues, and have vowed to resist intrusions in their territory by any power--are undoubtedly viewed by Moscow as the least reliable of their Pact allies, despite the internal orthodoxy and rigidity of the Romanian political system.

Exploiting Soviet Vulnerabilities

(U) NATO has limited resources for influencing the reliability of the NSWP armed forces. Overt actions designed to undermine the reliability of these forces would be construed by the Soviets as hostile acts and probably would elicit a sharp Soviet reaction. Nevertheless, there are several tactics available to the West which could serve to degrade Pact reliability as perceived by the Soviets and deter the USSR from initiating an attack upon NATO. These tactics primarily involve measures in the economic, diplomatic, and cultural realms which would be designed to draw these countries closer to the West and loosen their ties with Moscow.

(U) Western trade with Eastern Europe has offered one means of expanding contact with these countries and increasing their dependence upon the West. The Polish crisis and the generally

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poor credit situation of Eastern Europe argue against any significant expansion of this trade in the near term, however.

(U) Western pressure upon the USSR and Eastern Europe to expand cultural contacts as provided for in the Helsinki agreements offers another means for achieving closer ties with Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies and undermining in East European eyes Moscow's characterization of the West as inherently hostile to the countries of Eastern Europe. Soviet resistance to expanded contacts lessens the effectiveness of this tactic; however, continued Western pressure may produce some positive results in the long run.

(U) One of the more readily available means for undermining the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact available to NATO consists of Western media broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Such broadcasts serve to counter the Soviet charges of Western aggression, reveal the offensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, and emphasize the one-sided nature of the Warsaw Pact and the general domination of Eastern Europe by the USSR. It is impossible to measure the effectiveness of such broadcasts in terms of undermining the reliability of the East European armed forces, but obviously the Soviets believe they have enough of an impact upon the populations of Eastern Europe to warrant jamming the Western transmissions.

(C) In the event of conflict in Europe, the NATO allies could employ a variety of psychological warfare techniques which, when applied properly, could significantly degrade the morale and re-

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liability of the NSWP forces. Existing ethnic problems, dissatisfaction within the ranks, poor living conditions, and general apathy are among the factors exploitable for the purpose of encouraging defections, desertions, and surrender.

(U) Obviously, the most effective means for presenting the Soviets with the problem of Warsaw Pact reliability is a Western military posture designed to deter or defeat a Warsaw Pact attack upon NATO. If the Soviets can be prevented from waging a successful short war against NATO, then the centrifugal forces prevalent in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should come into play. Under such conditions, the Soviets would be unable to maintain overall confidence in the reliability of their Warsaw Pact allies.

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